America’s third biggest bank, JP Morgan — which has been involved in the rescue of the fifth largest, Bear Stearns — has been hit again by the subprime crisis.

This time the blow is more than $5 billion (£2.6bn), taking its credit crunch losses to around $15 billion since August — an unparalleled rate of attrition.

Meanwhile, the bank’s profits tumbled by 51pc to $2.5 billion in Q1, eased slightly by a winning bet on the flotation of card giant, Visa.

Since the Fed is backing JP’s rescue of Bear with $30 billion, this will send a shudder down the spine of Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve’s Chairman.

Signs that the crunch is biting even deeper are coming across the board. House building in the U.S. is now at its lowest level for 17 years. JP Morgan suffered a 20pc reversal in its credit card division, while its retail banking arm slipped by over a billion dollars.

JP’s chief, Jamie Dimon, said, “The Economic environment will continue to be weak and the capital markets will remain under stress.”

With Britain beginning to feel the strain, along with some European economies, it’s clear that the worst is still to come.

As the first wave of the credit crunch plays itself to a messy conclusion, we are almost certainly now into its second leg.

Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) may have been the opening gambit, but credit default swaps (CDSs) are the new kids on the block.

George Soros estimates that the value of CDSs now equals half of the U.S.’s household wealth, an almost unimaginable number — let’s call it $23 trillion. So what are CDSs?

They are hedges made by investors in case a company defaults on its debts. In effect you bet on a company failing to protect your investment in the event it does just that.

The problem arises when large numbers of companies go bust and the CDSs themselves become worthless since no-one can pay them out.

A CDS seller undertakes to compensate a buyer if a corporate bond defaults. Since there is no limit to the size of cover taken out, the value of CDSs often exceeds a company’s debts.

Moreover, many CDSs are bought with borrowed money so the infection of the system drives deep into the financial heartland like veins in a blue cheese.

As defaults rise to unprecedented levels, so the whole ricketty system threatens to collapse.

Another nightmare to look forward to.

It’s official! Well, almost. The IMF, that august body which presumes to overlook the “world economy”, has used the “T” word.

The International Monetary Fund says that losses from the credit crunch by financial institutions worldwide are set to reach $1 trillion (£500 billion), threatening severe economic fallout.

The Fund says, “At present, the issuance of most structured credit products — instruments that pool and tranche credit risk exposures in various ways — is at a standstill and many banks are coping with losses and involuntary balance expansions.”

On the day when the UK’s biggest mortgage lender, the Halifax, reported a staggering 2.5pc drop in house prices in March alone, the IMF warns governments, central banks and regulators that they now face a test of their mettle unique in modern times.

In its twice-yearly Global Financial Stability Report, the Fund remarks, “The critical challenge now facing policymakers is to take immediate steps to mitigate the risks of an even more wrenching adjustment.”

The danger is that the escalating losses of banks, combined with credit market uncertainties, could generate a vicious downward spiral as they weaken economies and asset prices, leading to higher unemployment, more loan defaults and even deeper losses.

“This dynamic has the potential to be more severe than in previous credit cycles, given the degree of securitisation and leverage in the system.”

The report indicates that this downturn is about more than just liquidity, as some commentators are still arguing, but is rooted in “deep-seated fragilities” among banks with too little capital. This “means that its effects are likely to be broader, deeper and more protracted.”

In addition, “a broadening deterioration of credit is likely to put added pressure on systemically important financial institutions.”

Moreover, “The corporate debt market appears vulnerable as default rates are set to rise.” Loan defaults on junk bonds (high-risk corporate debt) have already begun to increase in both the US and Europe, which is “an area of specific concern”.

“This leaves financial institutions, most recently hedge funds, vulnerable to mutually reinforcing funding and market liquidity spirals, in which investors sell assets to meet funding requirements, creating price declines, a loss of confidence, and further funding pressures.”

The IMF advises : “National authorities may wish to prepare contingency plans for dealing with large stocks of impaired assets if writedowns lead to disruptive dynamics and significant negative effects on the real economy.”

Which broadly means that the situation is bad and getting worse, and the worst-case scenario may be just around the corner.

Macroeconomics was never so fascinating, and never so scary.

Read the report here.

This article is adapted from a piece which appeared in Syntagma in March.

That old pendulum is swinging again and at a speed that threatens disaster for banks and economies alike.

During the Thatcher decade (1980s) the politburo socialism of the 1970s was jettisoned all over the world — apart from in isolated outposts like Castro’s Cuba. Both the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union crashed to oblivion, and Mao’s China turned to its own version of capitalism.

That long swing to market dominance over centralized control has continued for nearly 30 years. Until now.

It’s about to go into reverse because of the vast mountains of debt built up in the system — an indebtedness that threatens to bring down the whole financial setup, investment and retail banks, and the “real economy” too.

Bank regulators are even now sharpening their swords ready to cut into the once-impenetrable jungle of bonus-led speculation and rampant hedonism that defines the financial markets, once the Rolls Royces of any respectable country.

Should we allow the pendulum — which more and more resembles the scythe of the Grim Reaper — to retrace its path back to the 1970s? Have we learned nothing?

Let’s just glance at the current situation in the markets. A spokeman for French bank Société Générale, itself a victim of the speculation culture, is deeply pessimistic, “We expect global equity prices to fall by up to 75pc from their peaks as a deep global economic downturn unfolds over the next few years.” A 50pc collapse in earnings is on the cards, made worse by an “Ice Age derating of equities”.

A 75pc fall in stocks matches Japan’s Lost Decade in the 1990s when they fell around 80pc.

The danger is that ultra-low rates will fuel another credit bubble which will put the real problem — huge debt levels — off for another turn of the screw, when it will surely be even worse.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard of the UK’s Telegraph believes, “The capitalist system is now so deformed by debt that it requires ever lower interest rates to keep going. It survives on perma-bubbles. Monetary rigour at this late stage would endanger democracy. How did we ever let matters reach this pass?”

The UK regulator — the Financial Services Agency (FSA), which failed dismally with Northern Rock, has just published a report on the affair which highlights the problems regulators have. The FSA simply lacked the up-to-the-minute expertise on the newest financial instruments of the people it was regulating. To make matters worse, it was grossly understaffed for the job it was asked to do by government.

Rather than going back to the Dark Ages of government control and draconian restrictions, it would be better to do a deal with the banking system to co-opt top bankers for a year to the regulators. They could be paid identical salaries and averaged bonus equivalents as the banks pay out. They would then return to their institutions to keep up with new developments.

This would be expensive and would probably cause outrage in the public sector, but it would be far cheaper and less demoralizing than turning the clock back to the bad old days of politburo socialism.

The depredations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in America, following the Enron collapse, is a measure of how to overdo regulation. Let’s learn from the past in order to safeguard the future.

In the meantime the vast columns of red ink splashing across the economies of the world will unwind fitfully and very painfully for years. There is no alternative.

We need to hold our nerve and steady the pendulum.