The UK Daily Telegraph is reporting that an unnamed rating agency is set to cut Britain’s credit rating following yesterday’s calamitous fall in bank shares and the government’s astonishing blank cheque for the banks.

Edmund Conway writes that this is only a whisper, but given the S&P reduction in Spain’s rating just days ago, it has the ring of truth.

Should it happen, it will put up the interest paid on “gilt-edged” government bonds, and filter through to almost every part of the economy.

Unlike Spain and Ireland, however, Britain has the advantage of a free-floating exchange rate that acts as a safety valve for the economy when times are tough. With interest rates approaching zero, more strings become available to pull, despite the apparent loss of monetary control.

However, the astonishing 96 percent fall in the share value of giant international lender, Royal Bank of Scotland — now 70 percent owned by the government — has led to some commentators calling the UK “Iceland on Thames”.

It would be a big blow to the fragile ego of Gordon Brown in particular. He knows that “his watch” has lasted 12 years and a catastrophe will destroy what little reputation he has left.

Should Brown be placed on suicide watch?

As the first wave of the credit crunch plays itself to a messy conclusion, we are almost certainly now into its second leg.

Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) may have been the opening gambit, but credit default swaps (CDSs) are the new kids on the block.

George Soros estimates that the value of CDSs now equals half of the U.S.’s household wealth, an almost unimaginable number — let’s call it $23 trillion. So what are CDSs?

They are hedges made by investors in case a company defaults on its debts. In effect you bet on a company failing to protect your investment in the event it does just that.

The problem arises when large numbers of companies go bust and the CDSs themselves become worthless since no-one can pay them out.

A CDS seller undertakes to compensate a buyer if a corporate bond defaults. Since there is no limit to the size of cover taken out, the value of CDSs often exceeds a company’s debts.

Moreover, many CDSs are bought with borrowed money so the infection of the system drives deep into the financial heartland like veins in a blue cheese.

As defaults rise to unprecedented levels, so the whole ricketty system threatens to collapse.

Another nightmare to look forward to.

This article is adapted from a piece which appeared in Syntagma on February 27.

We’re talking about the American economy, of course — now in recession, as we’ve been predicting for months — and the British and European financial positions, which are trailing some way behind the U.S., but about to implode too.

We’ve been on the case since last June when the ominous tag “credit crunch” started to be bandied about in response to falling American house prices.

As online publishers we are partially protected from the ravages faced by bricks and mortar operations. Even so, Google responded to the same data last year by dumping lots of small publishers using its AdWords/AdSense programs and its range of offshoot partnerships.

The knock-on effects lowered the earning power of a whole raft of mid-sized publishers who operate below the glass ceiling of scalability needed to challenge the giant press barons of the print media.

Given the power of this pincer movement, how should internet marketers and publishers ride out the troubles ahead, which may even include another dotcom crash?

Here at Syntagma we are developing two new business models which don’t depend exclusively on Google rankings and big investment in assets. We have also moved to conserve cash, now the most sought after commodity in global financial markets. Forget equities, bonds and angel lending. Asset-backing is truly out of fashion. Only cash and gold will do during the next two to five years, or maybe even longer than that. Japan took more than a decade to haul itself out of its banking crisis and the profound deflation of the 1990s.

I really don’t see how mid-sized businesses, with heavy debt, and/or lots of equity in the hands of VCs, can get through this otherwise.

The Fed’s dramatic easing of monetary policy, which still has some way to go, is barely making an impact, although the usual lags apply. In the 1990s, Japan found that zero, even negative, interest rates could not persuade its reluctant public to splash out in the shops. Longer term rates in the U.S. are already close to zero.

Ben Bernanke is apparently studying the Japanese experience of zero rates right now. Surely a sign of what’s to come.

The game now appears to be out of the hands of the authorities whatever they decide to do. Bernanke deserves credit for at least trying. His next move will surely be to throw the kitchen sink at the problem and let the Devil take the hindmost. This is no time for musings on “moral hazard”, the hazard is not inflation but deflation and slump. Massive U.S. Government loans to individual defaulters can’t be ruled out and may be just around the corner.

Compare that to the lethargic approach of the Bank of England and the European Central Bank. Still holding rates at 5.25 percent and 4 percent respectively, although the BoE has little room to manoeuvre thanks to Gordon Brown’s obsession with public-sector spending.

The first casualties could be some major institutions in America and monetary union in Europe, where the euro currency is looking very vulnerable. At least Brown got that right.

Syntagma predicts we are going to be amazed by developments in the not too distant future. The world may look a very different place when we come out of this, and it won’t necessarily be all bad news. Bubbles have to burst. Nature demands it. And the end of the eurozone would be a big plus for European freedom.

Nearly a year ago I wrote a post called These are the good times. They were and still are, uncomfortable though the ride may be.

This article is adapted from a piece which appeared in Syntagma on February 27.

Banks are pulling back from the industrial securitization of risk that has blown up so spectacularly in their faces.

So called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are the supermarket sausages of the financial system — nobody knows what’s in them, and most prefer not to.

In the old days, banks took the risk of lending money on themselves and ensured that borrowers would be able to pay it back over time. Securitization means that they can lend to any Tom, Dick or Harriet, package up the debts into large parcels of small slices from many borrowers, and sell them onto other banks and finance houses.

When house prices are rising fast, and rates are low (thanks to the Iraq war — see yesterday’s post), there will be no problem. How quickly the weather can change.

Now there’s a rush back to caution and traditional virtues — and not before time.

The Private Equity industry is currently holding its global jamboree in Germany. What a difference a year makes. Just months ago (pre-August 9, to be precise) the Private Equity barons were borrowing billions to take over all manner of companies, many blue-chip, and some national strategic giants. Now the sources of funds are drying up and the world has become a much more anxious place.

Not so long ago, securitization of talent was the goal for what HG Wells called “originative intellectual workers” — the kind of people who work from a laptop and a cell phone, hot-desking from place to place. They were advised to raise money on future earnings by selling shares in themselves. Specialized markets were to spring up, something like the London Stock Exchange’s AIM market, to flog these things to admirers with more money than sense.

I suppose if you turned into a Bill Gates or the Google guys your investors would be happy — but how many of us do?

The whole notion of securitization is targeted on bypassing the present reality in favour of an unknown future, using other people’s money — often their pension funds or insurance pots. In essence it’s no different from betting on racehorses.

Now the bubble has burst and cold realism has dawned, even for the godlings of private equity and their blood brothers, venture capitalists.

The beneficiaries will be China, and the sovereign wealth funds of Asia, including the Middle East. Western financial centres have permitted power to pass from settled democracies under the rule of law, to the potentates of totalitarian regimes whose oil deposits or cheap, exploited labour will soon allow to rule over us in many covert ways yet to be revealed.

And why? The abandonment of risk management in the cause of easy pickings.

Who will hold the banks to account?

Nobody — it’s too risky.